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The objective of this study is to analyse pilots’ decision-making behaviour in terms of naturalistic 
decision-making. In line with the highly experienced group of pilots (n = 120), recognition-primed 
decisions are expected to dominate. In a full-flight simulator experiment, with two groups of pilots 
(short-haul and long-haul pilots) with different levels of practice and training, we were able to show 
that only about one-third of the pilots make recognition-primed decisions. Results may indicate that the 
current training practice helps pilots to handle foreseeable problems very well, yet does not support 
pilots in ambivalent and new decision-making situations. Based on these findings, we recommend the 
incorporation of more unforeseen events in recurrent training simulator missions to train pilots in 
handling unknown situations. 
 
Practitioner Summary: The results from a flight-simulator study showed that pilots’ decision-making 
is more analytical than recognition-primed. A possible reason for this could be the pressure for 
justification, or simply that pilots cannot use their experience in unforeseen situations. Hence, training 
should include more unforeseen events. 
 
Keywords: recognition-primed decision (RPD), naturalistic decision-making (NDM), flight-simulator, 
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1. Introduction 
Checklists and procedures were introduced in the aviation domain decades ago to enhance different 
aspects of safety, standardisation and human reliability (e.g. Degani & Wiener, 1990). Although the reliability 
of the whole aviation system has been greatly improved during the last decades, in some rare cases, pilots 
have had to make decisions that required going beyond prescribed procedures. They are sometimes faced 
with situations which cannot be managed by applying procedures or analytical decision-making. There are 
two recent incidents exemplifying this very well: US Airways Flight 1549 and Qantas Flight 32.  
When the crew of US Airways Flight 1549 took off from LaGuardia, they hit a flock of birds, resulting in 
the loss of both engines (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010). In this extremely time-critical scenario, 
the Captain instinctively decided not to follow the procedures, but to land on the Hudson. Although he did not 
follow the procedure, it seems he was able to rely on his experience and to make a good decision that led to 
the survival of all the passengers. The conditions of this situation such as time pressure, the high-risk 
environment and the pilots as domain specific experts, assign this scenario as framework for natural decision 
making (cf. Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). The crew of Qantas Flight 32 was faced with an uncontained engine 
failure shortly after take-off (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2013). The five pilots on board of the Airbus 
A380 then would have had to work through more than 100 procedures but, at one point, decided to stop the 
trouble-shooting and landed. This might also be an example for a natural decision making situation. The 
question arises how experience can support pilots’ decision-making in unforeseen and critical situations. 
In current training, pilots mainly develop experience in terms of checklist or procedure-handling to solve 
problems analytically. Consequently, pilots can rely on their experience as long as no ambivalent, 
intermittent or multiple influencing factors are present. The question arises as to what extent pilots are able 
to develop solid experience to recognise patterns also in ambivalent, unforeseen, and new situations. In 
other words, how do pilots become competent in dealing with unclear situations if the training emphasis lies 
on pre-defined situations and procedure application? What made the pilots of the US Airways Flight 1549 
and Qantas Flight 32 deviate from their analytical behaviour and adherence to procedures? Consequently, 
the question arises whether pilots can make effective use of their experience in relevant decision situations.  
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It must be pointed out that the intention of this paper is neither to question the necessity of procedures 
and checklists, nor to evaluate different decision-making approaches with regard to their outcome; this 
analysis aims to understand how pilots actually come to their decisions and how naturalistic decision-making 
might be a valuable training aspect. 
 
2. Literature 
The naturalistic decision-making (NDM) field of research considers intuition as a reliable source for 
experts’ decision-making (Klein, 1993a). While this approach was introduced back in 1946 when analysing 
chess masters’ behaviour (De Groot, 1978), Gary Klein represents the NDM research field nowadays, cf. 
Klein (1993a). Chase and Simon (1973) found that chess masters were able to recognise different sets of 
chessmen patterns and were thereby able to see the best manoeuvres. In contrast to the NDM approach, 
the heuristic and biases approach (HB) finds experts’ decision-making critical. Meehl (1954) found that the 
decision-making performance of clinical psychologists was worse than predictions from statistical models. 
Nowadays, Daniel Kahnemann has showed that experts, although they receive training, often base their 
decision on wrong assumptions (Kahnemann, 2011). Kahnemann and Klein (2009) clarified under which 
circumstances experience can be established, and stated that this ability also depends on particular personal 
factors. Furthermore, several studies indicate that factors, such as engagement or motivation, influence the 
establishment of skilled intuition (Kahnemann & Klein, 2009). They pointed out another very important factor 
influencing skilled intuition is creative intuition – the ability to find valid patterns in memory.  
The NDM approach places emphasis on situations which are affected by time pressure, domain-specific 
experience of the decision-makers, high-risk environments, badly-structured decision problems and dynamic 
situations, as well as organisational goals and norms (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Pruitt, 1996). Klein (1993a) 
formed the term, the recognition primed-decision model (RPD), which describes experts’ strategies to make 
fast decisions in highly critical situations. He found that experienced firefighters, for example, did not 
compare different options in critical situations, but were able to recognise specific patterns and were thus 
able to react appropriately (Klein, 1993a). In fact, experts evaluate the first option that comes into their mind 
for its feasibility; if the option seems feasible, they choose it, if it does not seem feasible, they reject this 
option and evaluate the next option which comes into their mind (Klein, 1999). To make recognition-primed 
decisions, the decision-maker has to have had the opportunity to gain experience in the specific domain, in 
order to recognise the stimulus and to act appropriately. As humans do sometimes make poor decisions, in 
the aviation domain, human decisions are often supported by automation and standardisation (Wiener, 1995). 
When it comes to the point where pilots have to make a decision, specific formalisms can be applied to 
assist the pilots in structured decision-making (Orasanu, 1995). As one example of such prescriptive 
techniques, the FOR-DEC model (Hoermann, 1995) became popular in German airlines. FOR-DEC stands 
for the steps, “Facts – Options – Risks/Benefits – Decision – Execution – Check”. While these analytical 
models work perfectly in abnormal situations without huge time pressure, they reach their limits when pilots 
are faced with extreme time pressure. Simpson (2001) found that, in such situations, RPD decisions led to 
better performance than analytical approaches. With pilots working in a highly dynamic environment, the 
question arises how they make their decisions and how their performance is assessed when being faced 
with complex and time-critical situations. 
 
3. Research Questions 
RQ 1: How do pilots make decisions? What is the proportion of recognition-primed decisions (RPD) and 
non-recognition-primed decisions (nRPD)?  
H1.1: Experience positively influences the probability of pilots using RPD. 
H1.2: Cognitive skills for generating associations and combining relevant information, positively 
influences the probability of pilots using RPD.  
RQ 2: How strongly do pilots benefit from their subjectively-perceived experience? Does this estimation 
distinguish between RPD and nRPD pilots? 
RQ 3: How often are pilots faced with uncertainties during flights? Does this frequency allow the 
distinguishing between RPD and nRPD pilots? 
RQ 4: How are pilots’ non-technical skills rated by an instructor pilot? Is there a difference between RPD 
and nRPD pilots? 
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4. Method 
4.1.  Test Design 
Based on the stated research questions, the test design, as visualised in Figure 1, was developed. The 
experience and the ability for creative problem-solving therein predict the probability of RPD; the decision-
making processes differs between recognition-primed decisions (RPD) and those which cannot be assigned 
to RPD – these are labelled as non-recognition-primed (nRPD). Based on their decision-making process, the 
pilots are grouped and the differences in respect of their perceived benefit from experience, their 
uncertainties and the instructor estimations are analysed. 
 
Figure 1.  Visualisation of test design. 
 
4.2. Measurement 
4.2.1. Participants 
In total, 120 randomly selected type-rated pilots, all from the same airline, forming 60 crews (30 short-
haul and 30 long-haul crews), were elected to fly a full flight-simulator scenario during altogether 20 
simulator shifts. Instead of having volunteers, the participants were scheduled by the airline based on their 
roster to avoid self-selection bias (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). The Captains 
(CPTs), including one female, were M = 47, SD = 6 years old and had M = 13,380, SD = 3,626 flight hours; 
the First Officers (FOs), including five females, were M = 33, SD = 5 years and had M = 5,325, SD = 2,723 
flight hours (Gontar, Hoermann, Deischl, & Haslbeck, 2014; Gontar & Hoermann, 2014). 
 
4.2.2. Predictor variables 
The flight experience predictor is operationalized by the amount of active affiliation in the air service 
which is the amount of years of ATP license holding as a pilot. Since the career as a pilot starts as FO on the 
short-haul, followed by being FO on the long-haul, going back to the short-haul as CPT, and finally being 
CPT on the long-haul, the selected sample of pilots ensures a high variance of experience. As decision 
making is the outcome of both crewmembers’ cooperation, we use the flight crew as one entity and calculate 
the crews’ experience as the sum of both individuals’ amount of active affiliation. 
In terms of the ability to generate associations, the remote association test (RAT) has a long history 
(Mednick, 1962; Kahnemann & Klein, 2009). Using RAT, the participants are asked to search for a common 
association of three given words (Kahnemann & Klein, 2009). A triple of rat, blue, cottage, for example, can 
be linked with cheese (Mednick, 1962). In order to avoid undesired bias by language proficiency, we 
designed our own word-triples using the German language. The German version is indicated by an asterisk 
(RAT*). In the style of the original RAT, 15 word-triples are presented to the participants; for each of the 
correctly-solved associations, the participant achieves one score point; the predictor is calculated as the sum 
of both crewmembers’ RAT scores. Experience, as well as the ability to generate associations, is expected 
to positively influence the usage of recognition-primed decision-making (RPDusage). 
 
4.2.3. Decision-making process 
The operationalization of the pilots’ decision-making process follows the approach of Klein (1993b), in 
which he assigned decisions to be recognition-primed when the participants/subjects did not compare any 
options. If they compared a single action alternative and evaluated it, their decision-making process was 
assigned as analytical. The same approach is used in this study. If the crew compares different options, their 
decision-making process is assigned as analytical, non-recognition-primed (nRPD) respectively. After the 
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mission, the pilots were asked to recapitulate the scenario as a cognitive walk-through. To encourage this 
process, the pilots were asked to use paper-based record cards, as is known from the Critical Incident 
Technique (Kanki & Hobbs, 2010; Ostrom & Wilhelmson, 2012). This helped the visualisation of the thinking 
process of the pilots and supported the discussion of the two crew members, see Figure 2. 
 
	  
Figure 2. Paper-based record cards used by the pilots. 
 
4.2.4. Dependent variables 
To measure the variables depending on the kind of decision-making process, questionnaires were 
developed which asked for the different aspects. The benefit of experience for the specific scenario was 
asked on a five-point scale, ranging from none (=0) to strongly (=4): “Were you able to benefit from your 
experience during the just-flown scenario?” Subjectively-perceived uncertainties were collected with the 
question: “How often are you faced with uncertainties in the cockpit?” using a five-point scale ranging from 
never (=0) to always (=4). The instructor pilot rated the participating pilots’ performance with the LOSA 
Descent / Approach / Land sheet on four different dimensions: Planning, Execution, Review & Modify and 
Overall Behavioural Markers (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003). The pilots were rated on a four-
point scale from poor (=1) to outstanding (=4). 
 
4.2.5. Experimental scenario 
According to the mentioned context factors for naturalistic decision-making of Cannon-Bowers, Salas, 
and Pruitt (1996), a flight simulator scenario in a full-flight simulator (JAR STD 1A Level D) is appropriate. 
Therein, 120 pilots had to fly a challenging approach scenario either to New York (Airbus A340), or to Nice 
(Airbus A320). When they lowered their gear, the green hydraulic system indicated a leak, so that the nose-
gear was not able to fully extend and lock, but also remained unable to retract. Due to the aerodynamic drag, 
the fuel consumption was doubled, with the result that the aircrews found themselves in a mayday situation 
with fuel on board for about 30 minutes remaining flight time. The crew then had to go around and work 
through the different procedures. With the hydraulic system being affected, the required landing distance of 
the aircraft increased, which again required the pilots to manually calculate the inflight landing distances. 
With this information provided, the pilots were now able to decide which runway they wanted to use in their 
second approach (main decision). During their following approach, the slats or the flaps also jammed due to 
the underlying green hydraulic problem, so that additional procedures had to be applied. As they are not 
important for this particular analysis, further details regarding the technical scenario can be found in Gontar 
and Hoermann (2014), or in Gontar and Hoermann (2015).   
 
4.2.6. Experimental procedure 
When the pilots entered the simulator, the aircraft was in freeze mode and in an appropriate 
configuration for the forthcoming approach. After the pilots had flown their mission, both pilots were 
separated into different rooms to rate themselves and their colleague regarding their CRM skills, such as 
communication, leadership, teamwork and work organisation, as well as their situation awareness and 
decision-making during their simulator mission. Both pilots were furthermore asked to fill out a questionnaire 
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regarding the benefits from their flight experience for this scenario and the uncertainties they are facing 
during flight operations. Those questionnaires were followed by a remote association task (RAT*) with 15 
triple-word combinations with exactly two minutes to answer.  
The debriefing began with a process-mapping, where both pilots mentally went through their simulator 
session whilst sorting record cards, which reflected their actions. During the process-mapping, the 
experimenter asked several questions to go into further details of the decision-making process. If one of the 
pilots stated that they had compared different options, the crew’s decision was assigned to be non-
recognition-primed; the participants were not told that this debriefing was conducted to analyse pilots’ 
decision-making processes to avoid any unwanted effects, for example, of social desirability. 
 
5. Results & Discussion 
When speaking in terms of statistical significance, a .05 level is specified for these analyses; error bars 
refer to the standard deviations. The Kolmogorow-Smirnow (K-S) test statistics were calculated to analyse 
the assumption of normally-distributed data; as all the data sets are non-normal, the Mann-Whitney test was 
used when comparing mean values. 
 
5.1.     Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables   
5.1.1. Experience and RAT* 
The results of the descriptive analyses of the pilots’ flight experience, measured with their active 
affiliation in the air service within the respective airline, reflect the different career stages and is shown in 
Figure 3. Testing on normal distribution, the K-S test revealed significant results, D(119) = .09, p = .012.  
 
	   	  
Figure 3. Pilots' experience as a function of 
crew position and fleet.	   Figure 4. RAT* as a function of crew position and fleet. 	  
The RAT*, reflecting the ability to generate associations, shows no differences between the four groups 
(compare Figure 4). There are no effects on the RAT* score – neither of crew position, nor of the fleet (short-
haul or long-haul); the K-S test showed significant non-normally distributed results, D(119) = .11, p = .002. 
 
5.2. Regression Model  
Regarding the usage of the different decision-models, the analyses showed that only 34% of the pilots’ 
main decisions can be attributed as recognition-primed (RPD group). The other 66% of the pilots were 
assigned to an underlying analytical decision-making process (nRPD group). We excluded the decisions of 
12 pilots where we could not clearly assign their decision-making process; hence, comparisons of the RPD 
and nRPD group are based on n = 108 pilots. In comparison to other occupation groups (e.g. expert 
fireground commanders decisions: 58% recognition-primed), the proportion of RPD decisions seems to be 
relatively small (Klein 1993b). 
A binary logistic regression, which does not require normally distributed data (Backhaus, 2006), to 
evaluate the predictors experience and remote association with regard to the probability of pilots’ usage of 
recognition-primed decisions, was conducted. Thus, the test design introduced in Figure 1 can be modelled 
as the following: RPDusage = f(experience, remote association), where RPDusage is the dichotomous 
dependent variable which reflects whether the crew’s decision can be attributed to RPD or not. 
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 Experience and RAT* are defined as independent variables operationalized with the sum of the two 
pilots’, (which form one crew) active affiliation in the air service within the respective airline, and with the sum 
of both pilots’ ability to solve a remote association task. The results show that the overall model is not 
significant according to the chi-square statistic, p = .66; the same is true for the predictors, where experience 
leads to a Wald statistic of .83, p = .36, and the remote association to a Wald statistic of .01, p = .92. 
These results lead to the conclusion that, in this setting, neither the experience of the pilots measured 
via their cumulative duration in air service, nor their personal ability to recognise patterns, influences the 
probability of recognition-primed decision-making.  
 
5.3.     Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables   
5.3.1. Benefit of experience 
The evaluation of the pilots’ subjectively-perceived benefit from experience as a function of their crew 
position, is shown in Figure 5. Testing for normality, the K-S test showed significant non-normally distributed 
data, D(116) = .30, p < .001. There are no significant differences between the CPTs and FOs, U = 1416, z = 
1.61, p = .11, nor between the short-haul and the long-haul pilots, U = 1597, z = -.50, p = .63.  
   
  
Figure 5. Benefit of experience as a function of 
crew position and fleet. 
Figure 6. Benefit of experience as a function 
of the decision-making process. 
 
The results regarding pilots’ subjective benefit of experience show no significant differences between 
the RPD group and the nRPD group (cf. Figure 6), U = 1131.5, z = -1.31, p = .19.  
 
5.3.2. Uncertainties 
Regarding the uncertainties, none of the pilots stated that he/she is never faced with uncertainties. 33 
pilots (28%) stated the amount of uncertainties as seldom; 58 pilots (50%) stated occasional; 23 Pilots (20%) 
stated often, and 2 pilots (2%) stated they are always faced with uncertainties. Figure 7 shows the 
subjectively-perceived amount of uncertainties during normal flight operations as a function of the crew 
position and fleet. The K-S test showed non-normal results, D(116) = .26, p < .001. 
 
  
Figure 7. Perceived amount of uncertainties as 
a function of crew position and fleet.  
Figure 8. Perceived amount of uncertainties 
as a function of the decision-making process. 
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The non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests showed no differences between the crew position (CPTs and 
FOs), U = 1581.5, z = -.60, p = .54, but a strong trend between the fleet types (short-haul and long-haul), U = 
1368.5, z = -1.87, p = .06 that short-haul pilots on the Airbus A320 perceive more uncertainties than A340 
pilots. Grouping the pilots according to their decision-making process (compare Figure 8), no differences 
between the recognition-primed decision-makers (RPD) and the non-recognition-primed decision-makers 
(nRPD) have been found, U = 1253, z = -.43, p = .68. 
 
5.3.3. Instructor estimation 
The results of the instructor pilot’s rating (cf. Figure 9) shows non-normal data distributions according to 
the conducted K-S test. The Mann-Whitney test shows significantly better ratings for the nRPD group, than 
for the RPD group, on the LOSA-dimensions of Planning Behaviour, U = 1032, z = -2.32, p = .02, and the 
Review & Modify Behaviour, U = 952, z = -2.86, p = .004. Execution Behaviour shows a strong trend, U = 
1102, z = -2.32, p = .06. Overall Behavioural Markers do not show significant differences, meaning that the 
overall performance was not rated better or worse when pilots made recognition-primed decisions or not, U = 
1294, z = -.70, p = .49. 	  	  
 
Figure 9. Instructor ratings as a function of different behavioural markers. 
 
6. Discussion 
Considering the results regarding pilots making less RPD decisions than other occupational groups 
(e.g.expert fireground commanders), this might have different reasons. As Klein (1993b) found, groups 
facing great pressure to justify, tend to use less RPD. This assumption might be applicable to pilots. All the 
decisions are stored on a data logger and, in the case of a malfunctioning system, a wrong or suboptimal 
decision causes different kinds of consequences; beginning with flight delays, which result in high costs, up 
to an accident with injuries or fatalities. Another explanation could be the fact that all the pilots in this sample 
had been intensively trained in the use of FOR-DEC, an analytical decision-making model, during their 
careers. Hence, in a decision situation, they might initially tend to look for options. The fact that the active 
affiliation in the air service shows no significant impact on the use of the recognition-primed model seems to 
be a contradiction. However, this contradiction is consistent with the independence of crew position on the 
perceived uncertainty of pilots. Pilots with more quantified flight time (CPTs), do not perceive fewer 
uncertainties or benefit more from their experience than flight beginners (FOs) do. This suggests that pilots 
are not always able to use their experience to cope with new und unknown situations, such as the scenario 
presented here. If the pilots are not able to build on transferable experience, the reasons for this have to be 
searched for in the pilots’ environment. Aside from simulator training, challenging situations during normal 
flight operations are rare. Foreseeable simulator training missions, however, make it hard for pilots to build 
up experience in handling unforeseen events. 
The results regarding the perceived benefit of experience show that it does not grow with the pilots’ 
amount of flight hours or the simulator training sessions accomplished. This leads to the assumption that 
pilots, although learning something new during every flight and training, might not be able to transfer such 
knowledge to situations with a large amount of ambiguities. This might also be a result of the highly-
automated working environment in combination with current training practice. 
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The trend that the A320 crews perceived uncertainties more often than A340 crews, might be attributed 
to the circumstances that short-haul crews (A320) perform more legs than the long-haul crews. As take-off 
and landing are also the most challenging flight phases, it seems logical that crews with more take-offs and 
landings face and perceive more uncertainties compared to long-haul crews who have to monitor the flight 
path for many hours in cruise flight. Another aspect could be that the A320 crew members are facing new 
tasks – the FO of the A320 only has little flight experience as he/she normally comes directly from flight 
school and does not have any airliner experience. According to the career steps (cf. Figure 3), the next step 
after being a (senior) First Officer on the long-haul fleet, is to go back to the short-haul fleet and to become a 
Captain. The CPT of the A320 is now responsible for the whole aircraft and the passengers. In contrast, the 
First Officer and the Captain of the A340 fleet have more experience in their respective tasks.   
The significant difference between the RPD and nRPD groups in respect of the instructor pilot’s 
Planning Behaviour rating might be due to the RPD users not comparing different options as the training 
standards would expect. Regarding the Execution Behaviour, it seems that both the RPD and the nRPD 
group perform on a comparable level with the trend to nRPDs being a little better. The same is true for the 
Review & Modifying Behavioural Markers, where again the nRPD group is rated to be better. According to 
Klein (1999), RPD makers completely mentally simulate their entire course of action at the beginning of their 
decision-making process. So, it seems consistent that the Review & Modifying, as well as Planning 
Behavioural Markers, are rated to be worse because these behaviours are not visible to the observer of RPD 
crews. A different explanation could be that, for the RPD group, it might be less important to review their 
already mentally simulated course of action again, as long as the perceived information does not change. As 
decision-making is only a part of the pilots’ performance, the ratings for the Overall Behavioural Markers for 
performance do not show any significant differences. 
In addition to the mentioned results, some limitations of this study will also be mentioned. The largest 
bias we see is the fact that we were not able to distinguish the decision-making processes between the two 
crew members, which resulted in only one common decision-making value [RPD, nRPD] for both pilots. 
Another aspect is the absence of a validated German translation of the RAT. We therefore had to translate 
and create word-triples for the provisional German RAT*.  
 
7. Conclusion 
As the occupational group of pilots is trained to use analytical decision-making processes, the 
presented results are in accordance with their standards. As every trained procedure has its limitations, 
training to cope with new and unforeseen situations seems be a beneficial addition. Pilots are experts and 
therefore inherently able to build on experience. In case they decide against using their experience, as the 
pressure to justify is so high, the training philosophy could encourage them to do so; if pilots cannot use their 
experience, the training methods and pilots’ environment should be adapted to allow pilots to build up their 
experience and handle uncertain and ambivalent situations. In both cases, whether they do not want to, or 
cannot use their experience, incorporating unforeseen events or malfunctions into current training practice 
would be helpful.  
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